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How our brains give rise to our minds is one of the most intriguing questions in all of science. We 
are now living in a particularly interesting time to consider this question. This is true because, 
during the last decade, mathematical models about how the brain works have finally succeeded in 
quantitatively simulating the experimentally recorded dynamics of individual cells in identified 
brain circuits and the behaviors that these circuits control. The models that have led to these 
successes incorporate qualitatively new ideas about how the brain is organized to achieve the 
remarkable flexibility and power of biological intelligence. 
These advances represent significant challenges and opportunities for mathematicians for 
several reasons. One obvious reason is that the models themselves are interesting mathematical 
objects. These models are typically defined by high-dimensional dynamical systems in which 
several types of nonlinear feedback operate across multiple spatial and temporal scales. They 
represent systems which are capable of autonomously adapting, or self-organizing, in response to 
a rapidly changing and unpredictable world. 
A second reason is that these models represent processes that are of great scientific and 
personal interest, including how we perceive a rapidly changing world, how we learn from it on 
our own, how we form expectations about what we believe will happen next, how we recognize 
complex events even if they occur in different contexts and from different viewpoints, how we join 
what we know about the world with what we feel about it to make decisions which are both 
possible and valued, how we selectively attend to events that particularly interest us, how we plan 
what to do next and carry out these plans despite the occurrence of multiple distracting events, and 
how we fuse together multiple types of information to decide where to look with our eyes, where 
to reach with our arms, and where to move with our legs. The great variety of these capabilities is 
mirrored by the heterogeneous organization of the brain into distinct but highly interacting parts, 
including such regions as the cerebral cortex, hippocampal system, cerebellum, basal ganglia, 
reticular formation, and so on. Detailed models of how these regions are organized have recently 
been proposed, notably how the characteristic organization of neocortex into layered circuits helps 
it to develop and learn in a stable way, to group distributed information into coherent 
representations without a loss of analog sensitivity, and to pay attention to interesting events 
(Grossberg, 1999; Grossberg and Raizada, 2000). 
A third reason is that these models may be applied in both medical research and technology 
in ways that can have profound effects on society. Applications to medical research include using 
the models to develop new algorithms for preprocessing and classifying complex medical images, 
and to show how the normal brain can break clown in various ways to cause mental disorders, 
such as schizophrenia and Parkinson's disease. Applications to technology include all the 
application domains wherein one can use a system that can behave intelligently on its own in 
response to large amounts of noisy data in an unpredictable environment. Such models are already 
being used in applications as varied as airplane design, automatic generation of world maps from 
remote sensing data, classification of macromolecules, and development of adaptive software for 
the world wide web (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1999). 
A fourth reason is that these models of the mind may clarify our understanding of many 
historical developments in mathematics, including the sources of mathematical competence itself, 
and the neural basis of geometrical concepts, logical thinking, imagination, and even 
COnSCIOUSness. 
A Theoretical Approach to Linking Brain to Mind 
The crucial role of mathematical modeling and analysis in these developments can be appreciated 
by knowing the type of theoretical method that has led to the recent breakthroughs. This sort of 
model development begins with an analysis of behavioral data, typically scores or even hundreds 
of parametrically structured behavioral (that is, psychological or cognitive) experiments in a 
particular problem domain. One begins with behavioral data because the brain has evolved in order 
to achieve behavioral success. Any theory that hopes to link brain to behavior thus needs to 
discover the computational level on which brain dynamics control behavioral success. As in other 
scientific disciplines, one works with large amounts of data because otherwise too many seemingly 
plausible hypotheses cannot be ruled out. 
A crucial constraint is to insist upon understanding the behavioral data--which come to us 
as static numbers or curves on a page-as the emergent properties of a dynamical process which is 
taking place moment-by-moment in an individual mind. One also needs to respect the fact that our 
minds can adapt on their own to changing environmental conditions without being told that these 
conditions have changed. One thus needs to frontally attack the problem of how an intelligent being 
can autonomously adapt to a changing world. How this happens has led to the core new insights. 
Such an approach has regularly uncovered new organizational principles and mechanisms, 
which are typically realized as a "minimal model" that obeys locally defined laws that are capable of 
operating on their own in real time. A minimal model in this sense is one that loses some important 
functional property if any of its mechanisms is removed. An important mathematical task is to 
understand bow variations of these mechanisms may have been specialized to deal with different 
environmental conditions. The remarkable fact is that, whenever such a psychologically-derived 
model has been written down, it has always been interpretable as a neural network that has always 
included known brain mechanisms. The interpretation of these brain mechanisms bas, however, 
often been novel because the behavioral analysis clarifies how these brain mechanisms lead to 
useful, and often unsuspected, functional properties. The networks have also typically predicted 
the existence of unknown neural mechanisms, and many of these predictions have been supported 
by subsequent neurophysiological, anatomical, and even biochemical experiments over the years. 
Once this neural connection has been established by a top-clown analysis, one can then work both 
top-down from behavior and bottom-up from brain to better characterize and refine the model. This 
merging of behavior and brain in a single model also h1cilitatcs their transfer to technological 
applications; behavior provides the functions and brain the mechanisms that are needed for the 
technological design. 
A fundamental empirical conclusion can be drawn from many experiences of this type; 
namely, the brain as we know it can be successfully understood as an organ that is designed to 
achieve autonomous adaptive behavior in response to a changing world. Said in another way, the 
brain looks the way it does because its networks provide a natural computational framework with 
which to control autonomous behavioral adaptation to a changing world. 
It has always proved to be the case that the level of brain organization that computes 
behavioral success is the network or system level; that is why the field of neural networks is so 
important to this endeavor. Does this conclusion mean that individual nerve cells, or even smaller 
cellular components, are unimportant? Not at all. Properly defined individual nerve cells and their 
interactions are needed to correctly define the network and system laws whose interactive, or 
emergent, properties map onto behavior as we know it. The recent Notices article of Nancy Kopel! 
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on We Got Rhythm: Dynamical Systems of the Nervous System provides an excellent example of 
how important it is to correctly define the individual nerve cells. 
These remarks clarify that, in order to understand how a brain gives rise to a mind, one 
must be able to freely move between (at least) the three levels of neuron, network, and behavior, 
with behavior understood as emergent properties of networks of neurons. Doing this requires that 
one has a sufficiently powerful theoretical language. The language of dynamical systems has 
proved to be the relevant tool, indeed particular classes of nonlinear feedback systems with large 
numbers of components operating over multiple spatial and temporal scales. Although it requires a 
interdisciplinary knowledge to derive these models and to test their ability to explain behavioral and 
brain data, once they are derived, they may be studied as mathematical objects with fascinating 
formal properties. The mathematical study of these systems is still in its infancy, but there are 
already many computational studies of these systems available that can help to frame such 
analyses, as well as a core of basic theorems, including global theorems about the limiting and 
oscillatory behavior of cooperative and competitive systems, and about how we learn to classify 
complex events in the world and recall them from memory on demand (e.g., Carpenter and 
Grossberg, 1991 ). It is here that a great opportunity for mathematicians exists that, I believe, may 
be on the scale of the opportunities afforded to generations of mathematicians from insights in 
theoretical physics. 
Complementarity: A Global View of Brain Organization 
In a brief general article like the present one, it is not easy to survey such a broad field. Perhaps an 
overview followed by some examples might be most helpful. Let me begin with some comments 
about how the brain seems to be functionally organized in the large. 
In one traditional view, our brains are proposed to possess independent modules, as in a 
digital computer. For this view, we see by processing perceptual qualities such as visual form, 
color, and motion using different modules. This view's supporters sometimes turn to the well-
known fact that the brain is organized in parallel processing streams. Figure I schematizes how at 
least three such processing streams within the visual cortex are activated by light impinging on the 
retina. One such stream goes from the retina through a processing stage called LGN parvo 
(classified due to its "parvocellular" cell type) to the cortical processing stages VI blob, then V2 
thin stripe, then V 4, and then inferotemporal cortex. Another such stream goes from retina through 
LGN parvo, then through VI interblob, V2 interstripe, then V4, and again on to inferotemporal 
cortex. A third stream goes from retina through LGN magno (classified due to its "magnocellular" 
cell type) to cortical processing layer 4B in area VI, then to VI thick stripes, then MT, and then 
parietal cortex. More will be said about the role that these streams play in vision in a moment. 
The existence of such streams certainly supports the idea that brain processing is 
specialized, but it does not, in itself, imply that these streams are independent modules that are able 
to fully compute their particular processes on their own. In fact, much perceptual data argue against 
the existence of independent modules, because strong interactions are known to occur between 
perceptual qualities. For example, changes in the perceived form or color of an object can cause 
changes in its perceived motion, and vice versa, while changes in the perceived brightness of an 
object can cause changes in its perceived depth, and vice versa. The existence of such interactions 
suggests that the mechanisms whereby we perceive the geometry of the world do not obey the 
classical geometrical axioms on which a lot of mathematics is based. How and why do these 
qualities interact? What is the geometry by which we really see the world? An answer to these 
questions is needed to determine the functional and computational units that govern behavior as we 
know it. 
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Figure 1 . Schematic diagram of anatomical connections and neuronal selectivities of early visual 
areas in the macaque monkey brain. LGN = lateral geniculate nucleus (parvocellular [parvo] and 
magnocellular [magno] divisions. Divisions of cortical visual area Vl: blob = cytochrome oxidase 
blob regions, interb!ob =cytochrome oxidase-poor regions surrounding the blobs, 4B = layer 4B. 
Divisions of cortical visual area V2: thin = thin (narrow) cytochrome oxidase stripes, interstripe = 
cytochrome oxidase-poor regions between the thin and thick stripes, thick = thick (wide) 
cytochrome oxidase stripes. V3 = cortical viisual area 3. V4 = cortical visual area(s) 4. MT = 
cortical Middle Temporal area. Areas V2, V3, V4, and MT have connections to other areas not 
explicitly represented here. Area V3 may also receive projections from V2 interstripes or thin 
stripes. Heavy lines indicate robust primary connections, and thin lines indicate weaker, more 
variable connections. Dotted lines represent observed connections that require additional 
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(Figure 1 caption continued) verification. Icons indicate the response selectivities of cells at each 
processing stage: rainbow = wavelength selectivity, angle symbol = orientation selectivity, 
spectacles= binocular selectivity, and right-pointing arrow = selectivity to motion in a prescribed 
direction. Adapted with permission from DeYoe and van Essen (Trends in Neurosciences, 1988, 
11, 219). 
A great deal of theoretical and experimental evidence suggests that the brain's processing streams 
compute complementary properties. Each stream's properties are related to those of a 
complementary stream much as a Jock fits its key, or two pieces of a puzzle fit together. We are all 
familiar with complementarity principles in physics, such as the famous Heisenberg Uncertainty 
Principle of quantum mechanics which notes that precise measurement a particle's position forces 
uncertainty in measuring its velocity, and vice versa. As in physics, the mechanisms that enable 
each stream in the brain to compute one set of properties prevent it from computing a 
complementary set of properties. Due to the complementarity of the brain's processing streams, 
each stream exhibits complementary strengths and weaknesses. How, then, do these 
complementary properties get synthesized into a consistent behavioral experience? It is proposed 
that interactions between these processing streams overcome their complementary deficiencies and 
generate behavioral properties that realize the unity of conscious experiences. In this sense, pairs 
of complementary streams are the functional units because only through their interactions can key 
behavioral properties be competently computed. These interactions may be used to explain many of 
the ways in which perceptual qualities are known to influence each other. Thus, although analogies 
like a key fitting its Jock, or puzzle pieces fitting together, are suggestive, they do not fully capture 
the dynamism of what complementarity means in the brain. 
It is also well-known that each stream can possess multiple processing stages. For 
example, in Figure I, there are distinct processing stages in the lateral geniculate nucleus (LON) 
followed by the cortical areas VI, then V2, and then V4 on their way to the infcrotemporal and 
parietal cortices. Why is this so? Accumulating evidence suggests that these stages realize a process 
of hierarchical resolution 1~( uncertainty. 'Uncertainty' here means that computing one set of 
properties at a given stage can suppress information about a different set of properties at that stage. 
Uncertainty principles are also familiar in physics, such as the famous Heisenberg Uncettainty 
Principle of quantum mechanics. In the brain, these uncertainties are proposed to be overcome by 
using more than one processing stage to form a stream. Overcoming informational uncertainty 
utilizes both hierarchical interactions within the stream and the parallel interactions between streams 
that overcome their complementary deficiencies. The computational unit is thus not a single 
processing stage; it is, rather, an ensemble of processing stages that interact within and between 
complementary processing streams. 
According to this view, the organization of the brain obeys principles of uncertainty and 
complementarity, as does the physical world with which brains interact, and of which they form a 
part. These principles reflect each brain's role as a self-organizing measuring device in the world, 
and of the world, and may better explain the brain's functional organization than the simpler view 
of computationally independent modules. Illustrative experimental and theoretical evidence for 
complementary processes and processing streams are described below. 
All Boundaries Are Invisible 
Visual processing provides excellent examples of parallel processing streams (Figure 1) and of 
how the dynamics of the brain differ qualitatively from traditional mathematical axioms about 
geometry. What evidence is there to suggest that these streams compute complementary properties, 
and how is this done? A neural theory, called FACADE (Form-And-Color-And-DEpth) theory 
(e.g., Grossberg, 1994), proposes that perceptual boundaries are formed in the LGN-Interblob-
Interstripe-V4 stream, while perceptual swfaces arc formed in the LGN-Blob-Thin Stripe-V4 
stream. Many experiments have supported this prediction. 
5 
A 
c 
E 
BOUNDARY COMPLETION 
oriented 
inward 
B 
D 
insensitive to contrast polarity 
SURFACE FILLING-IN 
unoriented 
outward 
sensitive to contrast polarity 
Figure 2. Visual boundary and surface interactions: (A) The emergent Kanizsa square can be seen 
and recognized because of the enhanced illusory brightness within the illusory square relative to the 
background brightness outside the square. (B) The reverse-contrast Kanizsa square can be 
recognized but not seen: We are aware of the square boundary even though the gray color inside 
and outside the square is approximately the same. (C) The boundary of the gray disk can form 
around its entire circumference, even though the relative contrast between the disk and the white 
and black background squares reverses periodically along the circumference. (D) The vertical 
illusory contour that forms at the ends of the horizontal lines can be consciously recognized even 
though it cannot be seen by virtue of any contrast difference between it and the background. (E) In 
this example of neon color spreading, the color in the blue contours spreads in all directions until it 
fills the square illusory contour. This percept illustrates the three complementary properties of 
boundary completion and surface filling-in that are summarized below the figure: The lines in the 
square boundary are completed using a mixed cooperative-competitive process whereby 
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(Figure 2 caption continued) boundaries can form inwardly and in an oriented manner between 
pairs or greater numbers of image inducers. The output of this boundary system is also 
insensitive to contrast polarity because it pools signals from opposite contrasts at each position, as 
illustrated by Figures (2B) and (2C). The blue surface color fills-in the square outwardly and in an 
unoriented fashion by a diffusive mechanism. It is sensitive to contrast polarity because it creates 
visible percepts of brightness and color. Boundaries are predicted to form within the interblob 
stream, whereas surfaces are predicted to form within the blob stream; see Figure I. 
FACADE theory suggests how and why perceptual boundaries and perceptual surfaces compute 
complementary properties. Figures 2A and 2B illustrates three pairs of complementary properties 
using a visual illusion that is called a Kanizsa square. For example, in response to viewing Figure 
2A, our brains construct a percept of a square even though the image contains only four black pac-
man, or pie-shaped, figures on a white background. As noted below, this percept is due to an 
interaction between the processing streams that form perceptual boundaries and surfaces. 
You might immediately wonder why our brains construct a square where there is none in 
the image. There arc several functional reasons for this. One is that there is a blind spot in our 
retinas; namely, a region where no light-sensitive photoreceptors exist. This region is blind 
because of the way in which the pathways from retinal photoreceptors are collected together to 
form the optic nerve that carries them from the retina to the LGN in Figure I. We are not usually 
aware of this blind spot because our brains complete boundary and surface information across it. 
The actively completed parts of these percepts are visual illusions, because they are not derived 
directly from visual signals on our retinas. Thus many of the percepts that we believe to be "real" 
are visual illusions whose boundary and surface representations just happen to look real. l suggest 
that what we call a visual illusion is just an unfamiliar combination of boundary and surface 
information. This hypothesis is illustrated by the percepts generated in our brains from the images 
in Figure 2. 
In response to the images in Figures 2A and 2B, illusory contours form inwardly between 
cooperating pairs of co linear edges in the pac man inducers. Four such contours form the boundary 
of a so-called Kanizsa square. (If boundaries formed outwardly from a single inducer, then any 
speck of dirt in an image could crowd all our percepts with an outwardly growing web of 
boundaries.) This boundary completion process is oriented to form only between like-oriented and 
(almost) co linear inducers. Both of these properties are useful to complete edges in a scene which 
arc not fully detected at the retina due to the blind spot. The square boundary in Figure 2A can be 
both seen and recognized because of the enhanced illusory brightness of the Kanizsa square 
relative to its background; see below for an explanation. In contrast, the square boundary in Figure 
2B can be recognized even though it is not visible; that is, there is no brightness or color difference 
on either side of the boundary. Figure 2B shows that some boundaries can be recognized even 
though they are perceptually unseen, or invisible. FACADE theory predicts that all boundaries are 
invisible within the boundary stream, which is proposed to be the interblob cortical processing 
stream (Figure I). 
Why are all boundaries invisible? The invisible boundary in Figure 2B can be traced to the 
fact that its vertical boundaries form between black and white inducers that possess opposite 
contrast polarity with respect to the gray background; that is, the black inducers have a black-to-
gray, or dark-to-light, polarity with respect to the background, whereas the white inducers have a 
white-to-gray, or light-to-dark, polarity with respect to the background. The same is true of the 
boundary around the gray circular disk in Figure 2C. ln this figure, the gray disk lies in front of a 
black and white textured background whose contrasts with respect to the disk reverse across space. 
In order to build a boundary around the entire disk, despite these contrast reversals, the boundary 
system pools, or adds, signals from pairs of sin1ple cells that arc sensitive to the same orientation 
and position, but to opposite contrast polarities. This pooling process occurs in the Vl interblob 
stream at the complex cells. This is how the square boundary in response to Figure 2B, and the 
circular boundary in response to Figure 2C, start to form in our brains. This pooling process 
renders the boundary system output insensitive to contrast polarity. The boundary system hereby 
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loses its ability to represent visible colors or brightnesses, since its output cannot signal the 
difference between dark and light. It is in this sense that "all boundaries are invisible". The inward 
and oriented boundary completion process that forms the illusory square is activated by these 
pooled signals in the V2 Interstripe area. These three properties of boundary completion are 
summarized at the bottom of Figure 2. Figure 2D illustrates another invisible boundary that can be 
consciously recognized. 
Such a boundary formation process in the brain is the mechanism whereby we perceive 
geometrical objects such as lines, curves, and textured objects. Rather than being defined in terms 
of such classical units as points and lines, these boundaries arise as a coherent pattern of excitatory 
and inhibitory signals across a mixed cooperative-competitive feedback network that is defined by 
a nonlinear dynamical system which describes the cellular interactions from the retina through 
LGN and the VI Interblob and V2 Interstripe areas (Grossberg and Raizada, 2000). In such a 
network, spatially long-range excitatory, or cooperative, interactions try to build the boundaries 
across space, while interacting with shorter-range inhibitory, or competitive, interactions that 
suppress incorrect boundary groupings. These interactions select the best boundary grouping from 
among many possible interpretations of a scene. The winning grouping is represented either by an 
equilibrium point or a synchronous oscillation of the system, depending upon how system 
parameters are chosen. Classical geometry is hereby replaced by nonlinear neural networks that do 
a type of on-line statistical inference to select and complete the statistically most favored boundary 
groupings of a scene, while suppressing noise and incorrect groupings. The emerging patterns of 
boundary excitation obey the three boundary completion properties (inward, oriented, insensitive) 
that are summarized above. Although there are global theorems about the stable convergence of 
competitive and cooperative dynamical systems (e.g., Grossberg, 1982; Hirsch, 1985), there are 
still no global theorems about the mixed cooperative-competitive dynamical systems that are used 
to group together distributed information in the brain. 
Smale (1976) has shown that an arbitrary n-dimensional system of autonomous first-order 
ODEs can be embedded into an (n+l)-dimensional competitive system of ODEs. An n-
dimensional autonomous system in this sense is a system of the form 
dx/dt = f,(x), where x = (x" ... ,x,.). (!) 
Such a system is said to be competitive if 
(2) 
Thus, increasing the activity x1 of one cell population can only decrease the rate of growth of 
activity in other cell populations x, with which it interacts. Interactions within a population can, 
however, enhance that population's activity. (For a cooperative system, the inequalities are 
reversed.) Thus even the class of competitive systems is too large to be meaningfully classified. 
The known theorems about cooperative and competitive neural networks, and those yet to be 
proved, characterize and classify that subset of cooperative-competitive networks that have been 
selected by biology to perform useful tasks, like grouping visual information or deciding which 
populations' activities should be stored in memory. For example, it has been proved under weak 
conditions on the functions a;(x,), b,(x,), and c(x), that every trajectory of n-dimensional 
competitive systems of the form 
dx/dt = a;(x;)lb, (x,)- c(x)] (3) 
converges to one of possibly infinitely many equilibrium points. The proof of this theorem is based 
on the intuitive idea that you can analyse the global dynamics of a competitive system by keeping 
track of which population x, is winning the competition at any time. This method is made 
mathematically precise by showing that "every competitive system induces a decision scheme", and 
by tracking the winning decisions through time while using a Lyapunov functional to determine 
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whether system trajectories will converge or oscillate in prescribed ways. This pmticular theorem 
grew out of an analysis of how input patterns are transformed before they are stored in short term 
memory, which is the type of memory that enables you to remember a new telephone number for a 
short time. A perceptual grouping is also a type of short term memory, but uses a more 
complicated dynamical system. Even the simple system (3) has many applications. For example, it 
can be used to provide sufficient conditions under which a competitive economic market will lead 
to a stable market price and to balanced books in all the competing firms (see Carpenter and 
Grossberg, 1991, Chapter 2). A significant fraction of all brain processes use cooperative and 
competitive systems of one sort or another, so the project of classifying them mathematically is of 
great importance. 
Surfaces Are For Seeing 
If boundaries are invisible, then how do we see anything? FACADE theory predicts that visible 
properties of a scene are represented by a surface processing stream, which is predicted to occur 
within the Blob cortical stream (Figure 1). A key step in representing a visible surface is called 
filling-in. What is filling-in and why and how does it occur? An early stage of surface processing 
compensates for variable illumination, or discounts the illuminant, in order to prevent illuminant 
variations, which can change from moment to moment, from distorting all percepts. Discounting 
the illuminant attenuates color and brightness signals except near regions of sufficiently rapid 
surface change, such as edges or texture gradients, which are relatively uncontaminated by 
illuminant variations. Later stages of surface formation fill in the attenuated regions with these 
relatively uncontaminated color and brightness signals. This is the main reason for filling-in. 
Remarkably, the same process can also allocate brightness and color signals to their perceived 
depths on a 3-D surface, through a process called surface capture, whereby the boundaries 
formed within the V2 Interstripes interact with the V2 Thin Stripes and area V 4 (see Figure l) to 
trigger depth-selective filling-in processes there. This multi-stage filling-in process is an example 
of hierarchical resolution of uncertainty, because the later filling-in stage overcomes uncertainties 
about brightness and color that were caused by discounting the illuminant at an earlier processing 
stage. 
How do the illuminant-discounted signals fill-in an entire region? Filling-in behaves like a 
diffusion of brightness across space. For an example, consider the percept of neon color 
spreading that is elicited by Figure 2E. This figure consists of circular annuli, part of which are 
black and part gray. In response to this figure, we can see an illusory square filled with a gray 
color. FACADE theory suggests that this percept is due to an interaction between the boundary and 
surface systems. In particular, the black boundaries cause small breaks in the gray boundaries 
where they join; see Grossberg (1994) for further discussion of how this happens. The gray color 
can hereby spread through these breaks from the annuli into the illusory square. In this percept, 
filling-in spreads outwardly from the individual gray inducers in all directions. Its spread is thus 
unoriented. How is this spread of activation contained'? FACADE theory predicts that signals from 
the boundary stream to the surface stream define the regions within which filling-in is restricted. 
These boundaries surround the annuli (except for their small breaks) and also form the square 
illusory contour. Thus, filling-in is a form of anisotropic diffusion in which boundary signals 
nonlinearly gate, or inhibit, the diffusive flow of signal. Without these boundary signals, filling-in 
would dissipate across space, and no surface percept could form. Invisible boundaries hereby 
indirectly assure their own visibility through their interactions with the surface stream, within 
which all visible percepts are predicted to form. 
With these comments in mind, we can better understand finer aspects of the other percepts 
that form in response to the images in Figure 2. In Figure 2A, the square boundary is induced by 
four black pac-men that are all less luminant than the white background. In the surface stream, 
discounting the illuminant causes these pac-men to induce local brightness enhancements adjacent 
to the pac-men, just within the boundary of the square. At a subsequent processing stage, these 
enhanced brightness signals diffuse within the square boundary, thereby causing the entire interior 
of the square to look brighter. The filled-in square is visible because the filled-in activity level 
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within the square is higher than the filled-in activity of the surrounding region. Filling-in can 
hereby lead to visible percepts because it is sensitive to contrast polarity. These three properties of 
surface filling-in (outward, unoriented, sensitive) are summarized at the bottom of Figure 2. They 
are easily seen to be complementary to the corresponding properties of boundary completion. 
In Figure 2B, the opposite polarities of the two pairs of pac men with respect to the gray 
background lead to approximately equal filled-in activities inside and outside the square, so the 
boundary can be recognized but not seen. In Figure 2D, the white background can fill-in uniformly 
on both sides of the vertical boundary, by diffusing around the horizontal black lines, so no visible 
contrast difference is seen. 
These remarks just begin the analysis of filling-in. Even in the seemingly simple case of the 
Kanizsa square, one often perceives a square hovering in front of four partially occluded circular 
disks, which seem to be completed behind the square, even though they are invisible there. 
FACADE theory predicts how surface filling-in is organized to help such figure-ground percepts to 
occur, in response to both two-dimensional pictures and three-dimensional scenes; see Grossberg 
(1994) and Grossberg and McLoughlin ( 1997) for examples. 
In summary, boundary and surface formation illustrate two key principles of brain 
organization: hierarchical resolution of uncertainty, and complementary interstream interactions. 
Figure 2 summarizes three pairs of complementary properties of the boundary and surface streams. 
Hierarchical resolution of uncertainty is illustrated by surface filling-in: Discounting the illuminant 
creates uncertainty by suppressing surface color and brightness signals except near surface 
discontinuities. Higher stages of filling-in complete the surface representation using properties that 
are complementary to those whereby boundaries are formed, guided by signals from these 
boundaries. 
Boundary-gated surface filling-in is a radically different view of how a surface is formed 
than the classical geometrical view in terms of surface normals or differential forms. The 
mathematical analysis of this form of anisotropic diffusion has hardly begun, even though its 
remarkable properties are already been successfully used in processing complex imagery in 
technology (Waxman et a!, 1995). Another important problem on which a great deal of work 
remains to be done concerns the origin of the complementarity of boundaries and surfaces. I 
predict that this property arises through a process of global symmetry-breaking as the embryonic 
brain bifurcates into its parallel cortical processing streams. 
The Link Between Learning, Expectation, Attention, and Resonance 
Visual and auditory perception have developed into large and multi-faceted fields during the past 
century, at least since the time of Helmholtz. As we ascend higher into the brain, perceptually 
preprocessed information engages higher cognitive, spatial, and motor processes. Learning occurs 
in all of these types of processes. As soon as sensory and cognitive learning arc considered, a 
formidable difficulty must be faced; namely, we can Jearn very quickly about the world, but then 
why don't we also forget everything that we have previously learned just as quickly? Neural 
modeling has clarified, as sketched below, how sensory and cognitive processes solve a key 
problem, called the stability-plasticity dilem.ma (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991; Grossberg, 
1999b), whereby the brain can rapidly Jearn about the world throughout life without 
catastrophically forgetting our previous experiences. In other words, we remain plastic and open 
to new experiences without risking the stability of previously learned memories. This type of fast 
stable learning enables us to become experts at dealing with changing environmental conditions: 
Old knowledge representations can be refined by changing contingencies, and new ones built up, 
without destroying the old ones due to catastrophic forgetting. 
On the other hand, catastrophic forgetting is a good property for spatial and motor learning. 
We have no need to remember all the spatial and motor representations that we used when we were 
children. In fact, the parameters that controlled our small childhood limbs in space would cause 
major problems if they continued to control our larger and stronger adult limbs. 
It turns out that cognitive learning and motor learning are also realized within parallel 
processing streams, often called the What and Where streams, that run through the inferotemporal 
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cortex and parietal cortex, respectively; see Figure I. Inferotemporal cortex learns how to 
recognize objects and events in the world; namely, What they are. Parietal cortex learns how to 
spatially localize objects and direct actions towards them; namely, Where they are, and How to 
physically engage them. These distinct What and Where memory properties are proposed to follow 
from another set of complementary mechanisms; namely, mechanisms whereby these systems 
learn expectations about the world, and match these expectations against world data. These 
complementary mechanisms are also predicted to arise through a process of symmetry-breaking 
during brain development. The present discussion will restrict itself to sensory and cognitive 
learning, both due to its intrinsic importance, and to the fact that a great deal of useful mathematical 
work remains to be done in this area, notably work that classifies the resonant states which drive 
sensory and cognitive learning, and are predicted to support all conscious experiences. 
To see how we use a sensory or cognitive expectation, and how a resonant state is 
activated, suppose you were asked to "find the yellow ball within one-half second, and you will 
win a $10,000 prize". Activating an expectation of 'yellow balls' enables more rapid detection of a 
yellow ball, and with a more energetic neural response, than if you were not looking for it. 
Sensory and cognitive top-down expectations hereby lead to excitatory matching with 
confirmatory bottom-up data. On the other hand, mismatch between top-down expectations and 
bottom-up data can suppress the mismatched part of the bottom-up data, and thereby start to focus 
attention upon the matched, or expected, part of the bottom-up data. 
This sort of excitatory matching and attentional focusing on bottom-up data using top-down 
expectations is proposed to generate resonant brain states: When there is a good enough match 
between bottom-up and top-down signal patterns between two or more levels of processing, their 
positive feedback signals amplify and prolong their mutual activation, leading to a resonant state. 
The amplification and prolongation of the system's fast activations is sufficient to trigger learning 
in the more slowly varying adaptive weights that control the signal flow along pathways from cell 
to cell. Resonance hereby provides a global context-sensitive indicator that the system ts 
processing data worthy of learning. That is why the theory which describes these processes is 
called Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART. 
ART predicts that that "all conscious states are resonant states" of the brain. Paradoxical 
data about conscious perceptual experiences from several modalities have been explained as 
emergent properties of such resonant states (Grossberg, !999b). The mathematical analysis of 
such resonant stales is thus of great importance. When one considers that quantum theory is, at 
bottom, a resonance theory for which much beautiful mathematics has been created, the fact that 
the mind also seems to be a resonance machine presents a great opportunity to interested 
mathematicians. More is said about how such a resonance develops below. 
In summary, ART predicts that there is an intimate connection between the mechanisms 
which enable us to learn quickly and stably about a changing world, and the mechanisms that 
enable us to learn expectations about such a world, test hypotheses about it, and focus attention 
upon information that we find interesting. ART also proposes that, in order to solve the stability-
plasticity dilemma, only resonant states can drive new learning, which gives the theory its name. 
How Are Learning and Memory Search Related? 
Learning within the sensory and cognitive domain is often match learning. Match learning occurs 
only if a good enough match occurs between bottom-up information and a learned top-down 
expectation that is read out by an active recognition category, or code. When such an approximate 
match occurs, previously learned knowledge can be refined. If novel information cannot form a 
good enough match with the expectations that are read-out by previously learned recognition 
categories, then a memory search, or hypothesis testing, is triggered that leads to selection and 
learning of a new recognition category, rather than catastrophic forgetting of an old one. Figure 3 
illustrates how this happens in an ART model; it will be discussed in greater detail below. In 
contrast, learning within spatial and motor processes is proposed to be misnzatch learning that 
continuously updates sensory-motor maps or the gains of sensory-motor commands. As a result, 
we can stably learn what is happening in a changing world, thereby solving the stability-plasticity 
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dilemma, while adaptively updating our representations of where objects are and how to act upon 
them using bodies whose parameters change continuously through time. 
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Figure 3. Search for a recognition code within an ART learning circuit: (A) The input pattern I is 
instated across the feature detectors at level F, as a short term memory (STM) activity pattern X. 
Input I also nonspecifically activates the orienting system p; that is, all the input pathways 
converge on p and can activate it. STM pattern X is represented by the hatched pattern across F 1• 
Pattern X both inhibits p and generates the output pattern S. Pattern S is multiplied by learned 
adaptive weights, also called long term memory (LTM) traces. These LTM-gated signals are added 
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(Figure 3 caption continued) at F2 cells, or nodes, to form the input pattern T, which activates the 
STM pattern Y across the recognition categories coded at level F2. (B) Pattern Y generates the top-
down output pattern U which is multiplied by top-down LTM traces and added at F
1 
nodes to form 
a prototype pattern V that encodes the learned expectation of the active F2 nodes. Such a prototype 
represents the set of commonly shared features in all the input patterns capable of activating Y. If V 
mismatches I at F,, then a new STM activity pattern X* is selected at F 1• X* is represented by the 
hatched pattern. It consists of the features of I that are confirmed by V. Mismatched features are 
inhibited. The inactivated nodes corresponding to unconfirmed features of X are unhatched. The 
reduction in total STM activity which occurs when X is transformed into X* causes a decrease in 
the total inhibition from F 1 to p. (C) If inhibition decreases sufficiently, p releases a nonspecific 
arousal wave to F,; that is, a wave of activation that equally activates all F, nodes.This wave 
instantiates the intuition that "novel events are arousing". This arousal wave resets the STM pattern 
Y at F2 by inhibiting Y. (D) After Y is inhibited, its top-down prototype signal is eliminated, and 
X can be reinstated at F 1• The prior reset event maintains inhibition of Y during the search cycle. 
As a result, X can activate a different STM pattern Y at F2 . If the top-down prototype due to this 
new Y pattern also mismatches I at F1, then the search for an appropriate F2 code continues until a 
more appropriate F2 representation is selected. Such a search cycle represents a type of 
nonstationary hypothesis testing. When search ends, an attentive resonance develops and learning 
of the attended data is initiated. 
It has been mathematically proved that match learning within an ART model leads to stable 
memories in response to arbitrary list of events to be learned (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991 ). 
Match learning also has a serious potential weakness, however: If you can only learn when there is 
a good enough match between bottom-up data and learned top-down expectations, then how do 
you ever learn anything that you do not already know? ART proposes that this problem is solved 
by the brain by using another complementary interaction, this one between processes of resonance 
and reset, that are predicted to control properties of attention and memory search, respectively. 
These complementary processes help our brains to balance between the complementary demands of 
processing the familiar and the unfamiliar, the expected and the unexpected. One of these 
complementary processes takes place in the What cortical stream that was described above, notably 
in the inferotemporal and prefrontal cortex (Figure I). It is here that top-down expectations are 
matched against bottom-up inputs. When a top-down expectation achieves a good enough match 
with bottom-up data, this match process focuses attention upon those feature clusters in the 
bottom-up input that are expected. If the expectation is close enough to the input pattern, then a 
state of resonance develops as the attentional focus takes hold. 
Figure 3 illustrates these ART ideas in a simple two-level example. Here, a bottom-up input 
pattern, or vector, I activates a pattern X of activity across the feature detectors of the first level F 1• 
For example, a visual scene may be represented by the features comprising its boundary and 
surface representations. This feature pattern represents the relative importance of different features 
in the inputs pattern I. In Figure 3A, the pattern peaks represent more activated feature detector 
cells, the troughs less activated feature detectors. This feature pattern sends signals S through an 
adaptive filter to the second level F2 at which a compressed representation Y (also called a 
recognition category, or a symbol) is activated in response to the distributed input T. Input T is 
computed by multiplying the signal vector S by a matrix of adaptive weights that can be altered 
through learning. The representation Y is compressed by competitive interactions across F2 that 
allow only a small subset of its most strongly activated cells to remain active in response to T. The 
pattern Y in the figure indicates that a small number of category cells may be activated to different 
degrees. These category cells, in turn, send top-down signals U to F ,. The vector U is converted 
into the top-down expectation V by being multiplied by another matrix of adaptive weights. When 
Vis received by F, a matching process takes place between the input vector I and V which selects 
that subset X* ofF, features that were "expected" by the active F2 category Y. The set of these 
selected features is the emerging "attentional focus". 
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If the top-down expectation is close enough to the bottom-up input pattern, then the pattern 
X* of attended features reactivates the category Y which, in turn, reactivates X*. The network 
hereby locks into a resonant state through a positive feedback loop that dynamically links, or 
binds, the attended features across X* with their category, or symbol, Y. The individual features at 
F, have no meaning on their own, just like the pixels in a picture are meaningless one-by-one. The 
category, or symbol, in F 2 is sensitive to the global patterning of these features, but it cannot 
represent the "contents" of the experience--e.g., the boundaries and surfaces in a picture--due to 
the very fact that it is a compressed representation. The resonance between these two types of 
information converts the pattern of attended features into a coherent context-sensitive state that 
can enter consciousness. In particular, such a resonance binds spatially distributed features into 
either a stable equilibrium or a synchronous oscillation. Such synchronous oscillations have 
recently attracted much interest after being reported in neurophysiological experiments. The 
mathematical analysis of such fast-synchronizing networks has just begun (Grossberg and 
Somers, 1991; Somers and Kopell, 1995). 
In ART, the resonant state, rather than bottom-up activation, is predicted to drive the 
learning process. The resonant state persists long enough, and at a high enough activity level, to 
activate the slower learning processes in the adaptive weights that guide the flow of signals 
between bottom-up and top-down pathways between levels F 1 and F2• Thus ART-based learning 
naturally suggests the use of singular perturbation theory, where the fast events are resonating 
synchronous oscillations and the slow events are learned changes in adaptive weight matrices. This 
viewpoint helps to explain how adaptive weights that were changed through previous learning can 
regulate the brain's present information processing, without learning about the signals that they are 
currently processing unless they can initiate a resonant state. Through resonance as a mediating 
event, one can see from a deeper mathematical viewpoint why humans arc "intentional" beings 
who are continually predicting what may next occur, and why we tend to learn about the events to 
which we "pay attention". 
How does a sufficiently bad mismatch between an active top-down expectation and a 
bottom-up input drive a memory search, say because the input represents an unfamiliar type of 
experience? This mismatch within the attcntional system is proposed to activate a complementary 
orienting system, which is sensitive to unexpected and unfamiliar events. ART suggests that this 
orienting system includes the brain region that is called the hippocampus. Output signals from the 
orienting system rapidly reset the recognition category that has been reading out the poorly 
matching top-down expectation (Figure 3B and 3C). The cause of the mismatch is hereby 
removed, thereby freeing the system to activate a different recognition category (Figure 3D). The 
reset event hereby triggers memory search, or hypothesis testing, which automatically leads to the 
selection of a recognition category that can better match the input. 
If no such recognition category exists, say because the bottom-up input represents a truly 
novel experience, then the search process automatically activates an as yet uncommitted population 
of cells, with which lo learn about the novel information. This learning process works well under 
both unsupervised and supervised conditions. Unsupervised learning means that the system can 
learn how to categorize novel input patterns without any external feedback. Supervised learning 
lets the system know whether it has categorized the information correctly: Supervision can force a 
search for new categories that may be culturally determined, and are not based on feature similarity 
alone. For example, separating the letters E and F into separate recognition categories is culturally 
determined; they are quite similar based on visual similarity alone. In this case, if the input pattern 
directly represented the pixels of E and F (which it, in general, would not), then both E and F 
might be classified in the same category with category prototype F, unless supervised feedback 
indicated that each pattern needed its own category and category prototype. Taken together, the 
interacting processes of attentive-learning and orienting-search hereby realize a type of error 
correction through hypothesis testing that can build an ever-growing, self-refining internal model 
of a changing world. 
A number of global theorems have been proved about how ART learning takes place in 
specific model systems, including global theorems about how an ART system can stably learn to 
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categorize an arbitrary list of binary or analog input vectors, including how the adaptive weights 
oscillate, what their equilibrium values are, and how many trials it takes to stabilize learning (see 
Catpenter and Grossberg, 1991 and references 108, 187, 127, 157, 177, and 181 in 
http://www.cns.bu.edu/Profiles/Grossberg). Here is one theorem about 
Stable Category Learning. In response to an arbitrary sequence of analog or binary inputs 
vectors, a Fuzzy ART system with complement coding and fast learning forms stable 
hyperrectangular categories R; ,which grow during learning to a maximum size IRJ S: M(l - p) as 
lw,l monotonically decreases. In the conservative limit, one-pass learning obtains such that no reset 
or additional learning occurs on subsequent presentations of any input. 
This Fuzzy ART model (ref. 187) represents a synthesis of ideas from neural networks, 
fuzzy logic, and expert production systems from Artificial Intelligence. The theorem proves that 
stable learning of an arbitrary list of input patterns can occur on a single learning trial, with 
categories whose maximal size (and thus coarseness) can be controlled by a vigilance parameter p 
that is defined within the orienting system of Figure 3, and whose adaptive weights w are 
monotonically decreasing in time. A large amount of mathematical work remains to be donh on 
proving such learning theorems, particularly towards proving how optimal learning occurs when 
the input data are noisy, probabilistically defined, and/or self-contradictory (e.g., medical, remote 
sensing, and world-wide-web databases) and distributed categories are learned whose individual 
cells, or nodes, can be part of several different categories (see Carpenter, 1997). ART models are 
already being used in many technological applications due to their ability to learn quickly and stably 
in real-time to categorize and predict large amounts of information in a rapidly changing world (see 
Carpenter (1997) for an illustrative list of applications). The vitality of the field may also be seen 
from the fact that every extension of the mathematical understanding of ART models has led to a 
corresponding increase in the range of important applications. 
Why Does the Cerebral Cortex Have Layers? 
How are these ART top-down matching rules actually implemented in the cerebral cortex of the 
brain? An answer to this question has been recently proposed as part of a rapidly developing theory 
of why the cerebral cortex is typically organized into six distinct layers of cells (Grossberg, 
1999a). This work proposes an answer to the general question: How does "laminar computing" 
contribute to biological intelligence? The proposed answer suggests how these layers support 
circuits which simultaneously realize three types of general properties: (I) self-stabilizing 
development and learning-that is, a solution of the "stability-plasticity" problem; (2) seamless 
fusion of bottom-up automatic processing of information and top-down attentional modulation of 
information processing based on system goals; and (3) grouping of distributed information into 
coherent representations that preserve their sensitivity to analog properties of the information-that 
is, the property of "analog coherence". Properties (I) and (2) suggest how ART mechanisms arc 
instantiated within the known laminar circuits of visual cortex, notably between cortical area Vl 
and cortical area V2 (Figure I), and by extension in other sensory and cognitive neocortical 
circuits. This model is called the LAMINART model because it shows how ART mechanisms are 
embedded within the laminar circuits of neocortex. Figure 4 schematizes some of the key 
LAMlNART circuits, all of which are known to occur in the brain. 
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Figure 4. The LAMINART model: The model is a synthesis of feedforward (or bottom-up), 
feedback (or top-down), and horizontal interactions within and between the lateral geniculate 
nucleus (LGN) and visual coitical areas VI and V2. Cells and connections with open symbols 
indicate excitatory interactions, and closed symbols indicate inhibitory interactions. The stippled 
top-down connections indicate attentional feedback. See Grossberg (l999a) and Grossberg and 
Raizada (2000) for further discussion of how these circuits work. 
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For present purposes, I just want to summarize how the ART matching rule is realized within these 
laminar circuits. Earlier mathematical work had predicted that such a matching rule would be 
realized by a modulatory top-down on-center off-surround network; see Carpenter and 
Grossberg (1991) and Grossberg (1999b) for reviews. Figure 4 shows how such a circuit may be 
realized in the cortex, and what it is. In Figure 4, the top-down circuit generates outputs from 
cortical layer 6 of V2 that activate layer 6 of VI via the vertical pathway between these layers that 
ends in an open triangle (which designates an excitatory connection). Cells in layer 6 of VI, in 
turn, activate an "on-center off-surround" circuit to layer 4 of VI. In this circuit, an excitatory cell 
(open circle) in layer 6 excites the excitatory cell (open circle) immediately above it in layer 4 via 
the vertical pathway from layer 6 to 4 that ends in an open triangle. This excitatory interaction 
constitutes the "on-center". The same excitatory cell in layer 6 also excites nearby inhibitory cells 
(closed black circles) which, in turn, inhibit cells in layer 4. This spatially distributed inhibition 
constitutes the "off-surround" of the layer 6 cell. The on-center is predicted to have a modulatory, 
or sensitizing, effect on layer 4, due to the balancing of excitatory and inhibitory inputs to layer 4 
within the on-center. The inhibitory signals in the off-surround can strongly suppress unattended 
visual features. This arrangement clarifies how top-down attention can sensitize the brain to get 
ready for expected information that may or may not actually occur, without actively firing the 
sensitized target cells and thereby inadvertently creating hallucinations that the information is 
already there. 
Within the cortex, such a top-down circuit is realized by a type of folded feedback, 
whereby feedback inputs from V2 are "folded" back into the feedforward flow of information from 
layer 6-to-4 of VI. This type of folded feedback has many useful properties that are explained in 
the original articles (Grossberg, !999a; Grossberg and Raizada, 2000). For present purposes, I 
just want to note that these laminar cortical circuits integrate ART properties of bottom-up adaptive 
filtering and top-down attentive expectation learning with boundary grouping properties that are 
carried out by long-range horizontal connections in layer 2/3. These cortical circuits are marvels of 
compactness and parsimony that are already starting to get designed into VLSI chips. Their 
description and mathematical characterization brings us to the threshold of understanding even the 
cerebral cortex of the brain, that enchanted loom on which so many of our most meaningful 
experiences, including our mathematical theorems, are played out through our lives. 
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